Court of Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales

• Medium Neutral Citation: Chand v RailCorp (No 2) [2011] NSWCA 80
• Hearing dates: 22 February 2011
• Decision date: 08 April 2011
• Before: Hodgson JA at 1; Campbell JA at 33; Sackville AJA at 34

Decision

Application for leave refused with costs.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

• Catchwords: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - Administrative Decisions Tribunal - Power to award costs - Interpretation of s 88 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 - Meaning of "costs of or incidental to proceedings in the Tribunal" in relation to proceedings before an appeal panel.
• Legislation Cited: Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 ss.4, 24, 88, 113, 142; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 s.110
• Cases Cited: B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 5) (RD) [2010] NSWADTAP 21; Chand v RailCorp [2011] NSWCA 79; Chand v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 11; Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 22; (2002) 209 CLR 478; O'Neill v Henry (No 2) (Costs) (RLD) [2010] NSWADTAP 54
• Category: Costs
• Parties: Bimla CHAND (appellant); ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS TRIBUNAL (first respondent); RAILCORP OF NEW SOUTH WALES (second respondent)
• Representation: Counsel: A CROSSLAND (appellant); K NOMCHONG (second respondent); Solicitors: In Person (appellant); Clayton Utz (second respondent)
• File Number(s): CA 2010/79611

Decision under appeal

• Citation: Chand v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 11
• Date of Decision: 2010-03-02 00:00:00
• Before: Hennessy N - Magistrate (Deputy President); Smyth M - Judicial member; Monaghan-Nagle L - Non-Judicial Member
• File Number(s): ADTAP 079026

Judgment

1 HODGSON JA: In circumstances set out in my judgment given to-day in associated appeal proceedings between the same parties ( Chand v RailCorp [2011] NSWCA 79), on 2 March 2010 the Appeal Panel of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal determined cost applications made by the parties: Chand v Rail Corporation of NSW (No 3) [2010] NSWADTAP 11. It made the following orders:

1. Leave is granted for RailCorp to appeal out of time against the Tribunal's failure to determine its costs application in relation to two adjournments at first instance.

2. Leave is granted for the appeal to extend to the merits of the Tribunal's failure to determine RailCorp's costs applications in relation to two adjournments at first instance.

3. Ms Chand is to pay RailCorp's costs of the two adjournment applications as agreed or, as assessed under the Legal Profession Act 2004.

4. The remaining applications for costs are refused.

5. RailCorp's application for suppression and related orders is refused.

2 The applicant has applied for leave to appeal against these orders. The application has been heard on the basis that, if leave is granted, the appeal will be dealt with without further submissions.

Statutory provisions

3 As well as requiring consideration of some of the statutory provisions set out in my judgment in the associated appeal proceedings, this application requires consideration of s 88 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 ( ADT Act) made applicable to proceedings under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 ( AD Act) by s 110 of the AD Act:

88 Costs

(1) Each party to proceedings before the Tribunal is to bear the party's own costs in the proceedings, except as provided by this section.

(1A) Subject to the rules of the Tribunal and any other Act or law, the Tribunal may award costs in relation to proceedings before it, but only if it is satisfied that it is fair to do so having regard to the following:

(a) whether a party has conducted the proceedings in a way that unnecessarily disadvantaged another party to the proceedings by conduct such as:

(i) failing to comply with an order or direction of the Tribunal without reasonable excuse, or

(ii) failing to comply with this Act, the regulations, the rules of the Tribunal or any relevant provision of the enactment under which the Tribunal has jurisdiction in relation to the proceedings, or

(iii) asking for an adjournment as a result of a failure referred to in subparagraph (i) or (ii), or

(iv) causing an adjournment, or

(v) attempting to deceive another party or the Tribunal, or

(vi) vexatiously conducting the proceedings,

(b) whether a party has been responsible for prolonging unreasonably the time taken to complete the proceedings,

(c) the relative strengths of the claims made by each of the parties, including whether a party has made a claim that has no tenable basis in fact or law,

(d) the nature and complexity of the proceedings,

(e) any other matter that the Tribunal considers relevant.

(2) The Tribunal may:

(a) determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and

(b) order costs to be assessed on a basis set out in Division 11 of Part 3.2 of the Legal Profession Act 2004 or on any other basis.

(3) However, the Tribunal may not award costs in relation to proceedings for an original decision unless the enactment under which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make the decision provides for the awarding of costs.

(4) In this section, costs includes:

(a) costs of or incidental to proceedings in the Tribunal, and

(b) the costs of or incidental to the proceedings giving rise to the application, as well as the costs of or incidental to the application.

4 Although this provision in its present form commenced on 1 January 2009, the Appeal Panel held that this was the applicable version; and in my opinion it was correct in doing so.

Circumstances

5 Complaints brought by the applicant against the second respondent (RailCorp) were referred to Administrative Decisions Tribunal (the Tribunal).

6 On 10 May 2006, the matter was set down for hearing before the Tribunal on 1 November 2006 for 11 days. According to the Appeal Panel's decision subject to this application, the following events subsequently occurred:

29 On 26 October 2006 Ms Chand applied for 11 hearing days commencing on 1 November 2006 to be vacated. Directions had been made for the filing and service of pleadings and evidence. Those directions were vacated on 9 August and further directions made. On 9 October 2006, RailCorp applied to the Tribunal for an extension of the timetable because Ms Chand had filed her material out of time. On 12 October 2008, RailCorp was given until 18 October to file the remainder of its material and Ms Chand was given until 25 October to reply. The hearing dates remained unchanged. RailCorp filed Ms Messenger's affidavit (annexing 4 volumes of material) on 18 October 2006 in accordance with the timetable.

30 On 23 October Ms Chand wrote to the Tribunal requesting that the hearing dates be vacated. That application was heard on 26 October 2006. The Tribunal granted the application in part by vacating the first three days of hearing, 1, 2 and 3 November. The hearing was then re-scheduled to take place for 8 days from 6 - 15 November. On 6 November, Ms Chand again applied for an adjournment which was initially refused but granted after lunch when new counsel appeared. The matter was listed to resume on 9 November. The matter was ultimately heard over 6 days: 6, 9, 10, 13, 15 and 24 November. Five days were vacated, 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 November.

7 Reasons given by the Tribunal for granting the first adjournment application were set out in the Appeal Panel's decision:

32 The Tribunal granted that application. It is useful to set out in full the Tribunal's oral reasons for decision on 26 October 2006:

Firstly, so far as the applicant Ms Chand is concerned she brings this application because she finds herself in the position where although she's had two solicitors involved in this matter the most recent solicitor Mr Oliveri has only advised her earlier this week that he would not be in a position to continue to act for her. Ms Chand has advised the Tribunal that the consequence of that advice is that she is now without representation and if the matter proceeds on this occasion to a hearing she would need to be unrepresented during that hearing. Ms Chand has drawn to the Tribunal's attention the prejudice that she is concerned that she would suffer by being required to prepare herself without legal assistance for that hearing and that would involve her amongst other things but in particular in familiarising herself with a large number of documents which were only filed or served on her by the respondent or by her then solicitor on 18th of October. No criticism is levelled at the respondent's solicitors or legal representatives for that lateness because that was in accordance with directions given by this Tribunal.

The applicant has pointed out and quite properly that from her point of view in effect from the 23rd of October, the date on which she received the documents personally, she has had little time to assess those documents and prepare either her own evidence or evidence of prospective witnesses who may be able to support the case that she'll put to the Tribunal. In response to those matters put by the applicant, Counsel for the respondent has drawn to the attention of the Tribunal the history of the development through case conferences at this Tribunal, the timetables set with the concurrence of the applicant's then legal representatives and which included in particular the setting down of . . .the 11 days for the hearing of this matter commencing on the 1st of November. That direction was given at a case conference before this Tribunal on 10 May 2006. In effect the applicant would or should have known of the hearing dates at least for a period of six months.

The applicant has also drawn the Tribunal's attention to what could be said to be the voluminous nature of the material that has been served by the respondent on the 18th of October. In relation to those documents Counsel for the respondent points out that the documents do not contain material that would be novel to the applicant as the material in those documents is material that has previously been disclosed in proceedings before the Industrial Relations Commission. Those proceedings were between the present parties to this matter. The applicant also is concerned about documents which she claims she has not seen and which were the subject of a summons or summonses to produce. The counsel for the respondent referred to a case conference before this Tribunal held on 15th of February 2006 in which Judicial Member Britton gave directions concerning the production of documents which excluded certain documents that were the subject of orders under the Freedom of Information Act.

The respondent states that the documents that were directed to be produced were in fact lodged with the registry of this Tribunal in some cases before and maybe in some cases soon after 15 February 2006. The applicant on the other hand states that although she has sought access to those documents at the registry, the registry has not been able to locate those documents. This in itself is not a matter that would justify adjourning the hearing but it is a matter that should be investigated to ensure that the documents that have been produced are made available to Ms Chand immediately.

In summary, the situation that is before the Tribunal today involves a balance between the degree of prejudice that may be suffered by the applicant on the one hand by having to proceed to present her complaints to the Tribunal on the 1st November . . . and on the other hand the prejudice which the respondent has put before the Tribunal in written submissions that were handed to the Tribunal in this present application. The further important aspect in the consideration of the balance of those prejudices is the fact that this Tribunal, in the case conferences that have been held concerning the management of the hearing of this matter, has stressed that the hearing dates would not be vacated except in the most extreme circumstances.

The Tribunal is not convinced that the situation relating to Ms Chand is such an extreme circumstance that the prejudice that she points to overrides the prejudice that the respondent would suffer if the matter does not proceed and the disruption to the program of this Tribunal if the matter did not proceed . However in deference to the situation that Ms Chand finds herself in, this Tribunal considers that some concession should be made to her and that she should be given some additional time to prepare for the hearing but without unduly interfering with the program that was set down for the hearing back on 10 May 2006. Accordingly, it is the view of the Tribunal that the hearing dates for this matter which were set down to commence on 1st November would be postponed so that the first hearing date will be Monday 6 November and that the hearing will proceed for the balance of the dates fixed that is through to the 15th of November. The Tribunal so orders. (Emphasis added.)

8 In relation to reasons for granting the second adjournment application, the Appeal Panel decision set out the following:

33 In relation to the second successful application for an adjournment made by Ms Chand's new counsel, Ms Gormly, on the afternoon of 6 November 2006, the extent of the Tribunal's reasons were as follows:

IRELAND: It's my reluctant assessment, I say reluctant because it goes against, I think, the wishes of this tribunal that matters before it be disposed of at the quickest opportunity. But having regard to the requirements of natural justice I think we might have to give you that extra time. Ms Nomchong I've cut across what you were saying, I'm sorry. I got your message though, you don't like it. . . .

IRELAND: But I still feel that given all the circumstances we don't have a lot of choice, we don't have any choice really, but to grant Ms Gormly this extra time to prepare. But Ms Gormly, and I say this to you and particularly to Ms Chand, I will not entertain any further applications. Ms Chand, I want you to understand that, I've said this to you till I'm blue in the face, I must be going red in the face, because you've made innumerable applications for adjournment and they've been disallowed. It's only out of deference to Ms Gormly's that we're considering vacating these extra days.

It's probably no comfort to you to reserve your position on costs for those days, but I'm prepared to do that, but in the long run it may not be of much worth. But certainly there will be that aspect to it. I think technically that I have to hear argument forward, but you may well be entitled to order for these days.

NOMCHONG: Well, certainly we will maintain our position in relation to costs. The only thing I wanted to say, your Honour, is that the first application for adjournment was made by Mr Oliveri--

...

IRELAND ... it is the order of this Tribunal that at the request of Ms Gormly acting now for the applicant, we will vacate the further hearing of this matter until 10am on Thursday morning. I reserve to the respondents the right to make an application for an order for costs for these three days, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, but that's a reserving of the application for costs and we will hear argument from the parties concerning that application at the end of the hearing of the matter before the Tribunal.

9 It will be noted that in those reasons, the Tribunal did not determine the question of costs, but reserved the question and indicated it would hear argument from the parties at the end of the hearing. The parties did make further submissions as to costs at the end of the hearing, but the Tribunal gave no decision as to costs when it gave its decision dismissing the applicant's complaints on 17 April 2007.

10 On 17 May 2007, the applicant appealed from the decision dismissing her complaints. Neither party had made any application to the Tribunal at first instance to determine the question of costs after it gave its decision on 17 April 2007, and neither party made any such application after the applicant had brought her appeal.

11 The applicant's appeal was dealt with in two stages by the Appeal Panel, with one judgment being handed down on 2 October 2007 and the other on 30 April 2009. When it gave its second judgment, the Appeal Panel ordered that any application for costs be made within 28 days.

12 On 25 May 2009, RailCorp applied for costs in relation to the appeal and the proceedings at first instance, including its costs of the two adjournment applications at first instance. The applicant also applied for costs in relation to the appeal and the first instance proceedings.

Decision of Appeal Panel

13 The Appeal Panel held that its power to make orders for costs under s 88 of the ADT Act was only in relation to proceedings before it, that is, the appeal proceedings with which it dealt. However, it gave leave to RailCorp to appeal out of time against the Tribunal's failure to determine the costs of the adjournment applications, determined that this failure was an error of law, gave leave to extend the appeal to the merits, and proceeded to determine whether the applicant should be ordered to pay those costs.

14 Having stated the circumstances of the adjournment applications, and the reasons given by the Tribunal for granting them, the Appeal Panel continued:

35 Ms Chand's main submission in response to the application for costs is that the affidavit of Ms Messenger, which RailCorp filed on 18 October 2006, annexed four volumes of material. That was the reason, she said, that her solicitor Mr Oliveri, ceased to act for her and which prompted her to apply for an adjournment of the proceedings. RailCorp withdrew any reliance on Ms Messenger's affidavit on the final day of the hearing. RailCorp says that it did not need to rely on the material in the affidavit because the evidence contained in that affidavit had been given during cross-examination of witnesses. RailCorp also pointed out that three of the four volumes of material attached to Ms Messenger's affidavit were Ms Chand's own emails, so that material could not have taken her by surprise. Secondly, the same material had been served on Mr Oliveri a month earlier in related proceedings before the Industrial Relations Commission.

36 In addition to the submissions made to the Tribunal, RailCorp says that the reasons advanced in relation to the adjournment applications, summarised above at [31], were not made good. According to RailCorp, Ms Chand's conduct in making vexatious, unfounded or unsubstantiated claims in support of her adjournment applications is a relevant factor in support of a costs order being made against her.

37 The Tribunal may award costs against Ms Chand in relation to the adjournments granted by the Tribunal if it is fair to do so: ADT Act , s 88. It may be fair to do so, where, for example, the adjournment came about through no fault of RailCorp. RailCorp served its material, in accordance with the Tribunal's directions, on 18 October, two weeks before the hearing was due to commence. Ms Chand's solicitor, Mr Oliveri, apparently formed the view that he was unable to respond to the material in that time and would not be able to continue to act for Ms Chand. Although we do not have the benefit of hearing directly from Mr Oliveri, it is a concern that he chose to cease to act rather than applying for the adjournment himself. That concern is reinforced by the fact that he resumed acting for Ms Chand on 9 November, after the adjournment had been granted. We agree with RailCorp that the remaining reasons put forward by Ms Chand as justifying an adjournment were not made out. In any case, whether it was Mr Oliveri or Ms Chand who 'caused' the adjournment, Ms Chand did not submit that any costs order should be made against Mr Oliveri personally rather than against her. In all the circumstances it is fair for Ms Chand to pay the costs of the adjournment. That conclusion is supported by the Tribunal's comment that the adjournment was granted, not because of the prejudice to Ms Chand of refusing the application but merely 'in deference to the situation Ms Chand finds herself in'.

38 In relation to the second adjournment, the Tribunal felt compelled to give new counsel, Ms Gormly, an opportunity to prepare for the hearing. Ms Chand had been ready to proceed with Mr Oliveri representing her on 1 November, but for the filing of Ms Messenger's affidavit. The fact that Ms Chand chose to engage counsel at such a late stage is not a decision about which RailCorp should be out of pocket. RailCorp was disadvantaged on each occasion because they came ready to proceed with the matter. In all the circumstances, it is fair that Ms Chand pay RailCorp's costs arising from the adjournment applications. We note that although originally listed for 11 days, the matter was ultimately heard over 6 days.

15 The Appeal Panel then proceeded to refuse all other costs applications.

Issues on application

16 The applicant relied on 13 grounds in her draft Notice of Appeal, some of them directed at errors in the Appeal Panel's ultimate decision on costs. Those grounds were not pressed by Mr Crossland, who appeared for the applicant at the hearing of the application; but I will briefly give some reasons why in my opinion those grounds could not have succeeded.

17 The issues that Mr Crossland did argue concerned alleged errors by the Appeal Panel in giving leave to RailCorp to appeal out of time against the Tribunal's failure to determine the costs of the adjournment applications. A further issue arose out of a contention by RailCorp that the application should fail because the Appeal Panel was in error in holding that it could not under s 88 of the ADT Act deal directly with the costs of the adjournment applications. This was argued in circumstances where the matter had initially been listed just for hearing of the application for leave, RailCorp's written submissions had squarely raised the issue, Mr Crossland advised that he was prepared to deal with the issue, and the parties consented to the hearing being treated as a concurrent hearing of the application and of the appeal (should leave be granted).

18 I will consider in turn the following issues:

(1) Granting of leave.

(2) Could the Appeal Panel deal with the question directly?

(3) Alleged errors in the costs decision itself.

Granting of leave

19 Mr Crossland submitted that the granting of the adjournment was an interlocutory function within the meaning of s 24A of the ADT Act, and that an award of costs in relation to the granting of an adjournment was an order "in respect of" an adjournment and thus was also an interlocutory function; and that accordingly leave to appeal was required under s 113(2A) of the ADT Act. He submitted that, while the Appeal Panel addressed the question of whether an extension of time to appeal should be granted, it did not address the question whether leave should be granted under s 113(2A) to appeal from the exercise of an interlocutory function; and that it thereby erred in law.

20 Mr Crossland submitted that the Appeal Panel made a further error of law in taking into account, as being a ground for an extension of time, RailCorp's belief that an appeal was not necessary because the Appeal Panel could deal directly with questions of costs. He submitted that, on the view taken by the Appeal Panel as to the effect of s 88 of the ADT Act, this amounted to a mistake as to law by RailCorp or its legal advisers; and such a mistake did not provide a basis for extending time.

21 It was submitted by Ms Nomchong for RailCorp that the Tribunal had reserved the question of the costs of the adjournments to be determined as part of its final decision; and that accordingly its failure to deal with those costs as part of its final decision was not an exercise of an interlocutory function. She also submitted that in granting the extension of time the Appeal Panel had taken into account all matters relevant to the grant of leave under s 113(2A).

22 If an interlocutory decision has affected a final decision, and there is an appeal as of right from that final decision, then as part of that appeal the correctness of the interlocutory decision can be challenged: Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 22; (2002) 209 CLR 478. However, in this case there was simply a failure to deal with an interlocutory issue that had been postponed to the final hearing; and in my opinion leave to appeal under s 113(2A) was necessary.

23 It is true that at least some factors considered by the Appeal Panel in relation to an extension of time would have been relevant to the grant of leave under s 113(2A); but in my opinion it was necessary for the Appeal Panel to address the question whether that leave should be granted, and it did not do so. However, particularly in circumstances where the point was not taken below, this would not of itself be sufficient to justify the grant of leave to appeal to this Court under s 119(1A) in respect of a decision as to costs, especially so when the quantum of costs is likely to be modest.

24 In my opinion, Mr Crossland's other submission is not sound. A reasonable mistake of law can be a ground for extending time; and so to treat it could not of itself be an error of law.

Could the Appeal Panel deal with the question directly?

25 Mr Crossland submitted that the Appeal Panel was correct to hold that it did not have jurisdiction under s 88 to deal directly with the costs of the two adjournments. The Appeal Panel's jurisdiction to award costs was limited to costs "in relation to the proceedings before it" (s 88(1A)), and the definitions in s 88(4) did not alter this. The "application" referred to in s 88(4)(b) was the original application to the Tribunal (see the definition in s 4, and s 142); and so "proceedings giving rise to the application" could not refer to first instance proceedings before the Tribunal.

26 I note that a differently constituted Appeal Panel in B & L Linings Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (No 5) (RD) [2010] NSWADTAP 21 came to a view concerning s 88 different from that of the Appeal Panel in this case, giving the following reasons:

72 We respectfully differ from this reasoning on the ground that it fails to take account of the terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (4) of section 88. When this provision is read in conjunction with the opening words of subsection (1A), it becomes apparent that the phrase 'costs in relation to proceedings' in the latter subsection includes the costs of and incidental to proceedings other than those which are 'before' the Tribunal as well as proceedings which are 'before' the Tribunal. This is because it is stated to include the costs of and incidental to 'the proceedings giving rise to the application'.

73 As the Tribunal held in Raethel v Director-General, Department of Education and Training [2000] NSWADT 56 at [39], referring to sections 4 and 142 of the ADT Act, the term 'application' in paragraph (b) of section 88(4) naturally means the application to the Tribunal, when (as was the case in Raethel ) costs are being considered at the conclusion of proceedings at first instance. But when costs are being considered at the conclusion of appeal proceedings, the term 'application' seems most naturally to us to mean the application instigating the appeal (which is actually a notice of appeal under section 113, as the Appeal Panel in Chand pointed out). This interpretation conforms with the opinion expressed in Chand as to the scope of proceedings that are 'before' an appeal panel. On this interpretation, paragraph (b) of section (4) must refer to the first instance proceedings from which the appeal is brought. These are 'the proceedings giving rise to the application'.

74 If, in the alternative, the term 'application' in paragraph (b) is thought to mean the initial application to the Tribunal even when costs are being awarded by an appeal panel at the conclusion of appeal proceedings, it must surely follow that the costs of and incidental to the first instance proceedings, as well as those of and incidental to the appeal proceedings, are embraced by the phrase 'costs of or incidental to proceedings in the Tribunal' in paragraph (a). Otherwise, an anomalous result ensues. The appeal panel will have power to make orders relating to the costs of or incidental to the appeal proceedings (under paragraph (a)), the costs of or incidental to any proceedings that 'gave rise to' the initial application to the Tribunal (under the first limb of paragraph (b)) and the costs of or incidental to this application (under the second limb of paragraph (b)). But it will not have power to make any order relating to the costs of or incidental to the first instance proceedings, even though they will have taken place between 'the proceedings giving rise to the application' and the appeal proceedings.

27 In O'Neill v Henry (No 2) (Costs) (RLD) [2010] NSWADTAP 54, a further Appeal Panel preferred the decision in B & L to the decision in the present case.

28 In my opinion, the view taken in B & L and O'Neill is correct. I am inclined to think that the definition of "application" in s 142 counts against the view expressed in par [73] of B & L ; but in my opinion the alternative adopted in par [74] is clearly correct, for the reasons there given.

Alleged errors in costs decision

29 The main contention of the applicant is that the applications for adjournment were caused by RailCorp's unreasonable conduct in filing and serving four lever-arch files containing 2000 pages of material, which ultimately it did not rely on in the case. This caused the applicant's legal representative to cease to act for her, and made the adjournments necessary.

30 That consideration was taken into account by the Appeal Panel in its decision. The circumstances that the material was served within the time for service of RailCorp's material, that three of the four volumes consisted of the applicant's own emails, and that the same material had been served one month earlier in related proceedings before the Industrial Relations Commission were relevant circumstances. In my opinion it was open to the Appeal Panel to come to the view that RailCorp's ultimate non-reliance on the material did not indicate oppressive conduct, in circumstances where RailCorp asserted to the effect that the material was made unnecessary by what the applicant had said during her lengthy cross-examination.

31 In those circumstances, no error is shown in the decision of the Appeal Panel, and certainly no error of law.

Orders

32 For those reasons, I would not uphold any of the proposed grounds of appeal. The conflict in the decisions of the Appeal Panel of the Tribunal may have justified the grant of leave, but on balance I think the appropriate order is that the application for leave be refused with costs.

33 CAMPBELL JA: I agree with Hodgson JA.

34 SACKVILLE AJA: I agree with Hodgson JA.

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Decision last updated: 12 April 2011