Administrative Decisions Tribunal New South Wales

• Medium Neutral Citation: Council of the Law Society of NSW v Nicholls [2012] NSWADT 222
• Hearing dates: 17 May 2012
• Decision date: 31 October 2012
• Jurisdiction: Legal Services Division
• Before: M Riordan, Judicial Member; J Wakefield, Judicial Member; Prof. R Fitzgerald, Non Judicial Member

Decision

1. The Respondent Solicitor is guilty of professional misconduct.

• Catchwords: Solicitor - Disciplinary proceeding - Practice in breach of provisions regulating trust accounts - Legal Profession Act 2004 Sections 254, 260 - Intermixing trust monies with other monies - misappropriation - penalty
• Legislation Cited: Legal Profession Act 2004
• Cases Cited: Brereton v Legal Services Commissioner [2010] VSC 378; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v. Clapin [2011] NSWADT 83; Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v. Simpson [2011] NSWADT 242; Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v Wakeling [2004] QCA 42; Daly v. Sydney Stock Exchange Limited [1986] HCA 25; (1986) 160 CLR 371; Harle v Legal Practitioners Liability Committee (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-605; Lancashire Railway Co v. MacNicoll(1919) 88 LJKB 601; Law Society of NSW v. Doherty [2010] NSWCA 177; Law Society of New South Wales v. McCarthy [2003] NSWADT 198; Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v. Jones [2010] SAS CFC 51; Legal Services Commissioner v. Brereton[2011] VSCA 241; Myers v. Ellman [1940] AC 282; Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v. Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204; Peters v. R(1998) [1998] HCA 7: 192 CLR 493; Stewart v. Layton(1992) 111 ALR 687
• Texts Cited: Riley, Solicitors Manual: Commentary (ed G Dal Pont: Butterworths, 2005, updated)
• Category: Principal judgment
• Parties: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales (Applicant); Fay Marie Veronica Nicholls (Respondent)
• Representation: C Groenewegen (Applicant); F M V Nicholls (Respondent In Person)
• File Number(s): 122008

reasons for decision

Introduction

1 In this matter the Applicant, the Council of the Law Society of New South Wales ("the Society") made an Application against the Respondent, Fay Marie Veronica Nicholls ("the Solicitor") alleging that she was a Legal Practitioner within the meaning of the Legal Profession Act 2004 ("the Act") and that while practising as such she was guilty of professional misconduct. It sought the following orders:

(1) That the Solicitor be reprimanded;

(2) That the Solicitor successfully complete a course on Trust Accounting that is approved by the Manager, Professional Standards Department;

(3) That the Solicitor pay the Society's costs, as agreed or assessed; and

(4) Any other Order that the Tribunal deems appropriate.

The Application and Particulars

2 The Application alleged that the Solicitor was guilty of professional misconduct on three (3) grounds, namely:

(1) Breach of Section 254 of the Act;

(2) Breach of Section 260 of the Act; and

(3) Misappropriation.

3 The Application was particularised as follows:

(1) At all material times the Solicitor did not operate a Trust Account;

(2) The Solicitor operated in Office Account with the National Australia Bank styled "Fay Marie Nicholls & Associates Business Cheque Account" BSB No. 082-299 Account No. 69-348-5898 ("the Office Account") and

(3) The Solicitor had access to the Office Account for the purposes of internet banking.

In the matter of Stokes

S1 The Solicitor acted for Mrs Louise Stokes in her family law matter.

S2 Mr Peter Larcombe, Solicitor, acted on the sale of property in which Mrs Stokes had an interest. The settlement amount of $18,800.00 was due to Mrs Stokes from the sale.

S3 On 23 March 2009 a cheque from Mr Peter Larcombe for $18,800.00 was deposited by the Solicitor into the Office Account.

S4 The monies described in the paragraph above were disbursed as follows:

CHQ DATE	CHQ NO.	RECIPIENT	AMOUNT $	DATE BANK A/C
9 Mar 2009	1557	Dr Gary Chong	220.00	16 Mar 2009
23 Mar 2009		F M Nicholls c & d	9,090.00	23 Mar 2009
24 Mar 2009	1568	Louise Stokes	3,000.00	25 Mar 2009
12 May 2009	1590	Greg Johnston, Barrister	1,925.00	14 May 2009
25 May 2009	1595	Dr Chatuverdi	330.00	5 June 2009
10 Jan 2010	1706	Moore Stephens Valuation Report	4,235.00	14 April 2010
		TOTAL	18,800.00

S5 The payment for the Moore Stephens Valuation Report was properly described as trust monies ("the Valuation Trust Monies").

S6 In the circumstances described above the Solicitor:

(a) In breach of Section 254 of the Act, failed to deposit trust monies into a general Trust Account; and

(b) In breach of Section 260 of the Act, mixed trust monies and other monies.

S7 The Valuation Trust Monies were in the Office Account from 23 March 2009 until 14 April 2010.

S8 But for the Valuation Trust Monies being in the Office Account during the period described in the paragraph above, the Office Account would have been in deficit for 53 days as follows:

TIME FRAME	DAYS	HIGHEST BALANCE $	LOWEST BALANCE $
15 Jun 09 to 6 Jul 09	22	4,154.04	2,875.27
27 Jul 09 to 6 Aug 09	11	3,810.10	3,727.30
7 Oct 09 to 25 Oct 09	19	3,888.42	2,883.42
26 Feb 2010	1	3,946.91	3,946.91

S9 In the circumstances the Solicitor misappropriated trust monies by:

(a) using trust monies other than for the purpose for which it was received;

(b) using trust monies for her own purposes, including keeping the Office Account in credit balance; and

(c) demonstrating a reckless indifference to the fact that her Office Account balance had on several occasions fallen below the amount of the trust monies deposited in that account.

In the matter of Mawson

M1 The Solicitor acted for Mrs Meredith Mawson in a family law matter against her former husband Mr Mark Mawson.

M2 By Federal Magistrates Court Consent Order pursuant to the Family Law Act1975 Cth Mrs Mawson was ordered to pay her former husband $50,000.00.

M3 On 19 July 2010 a cheque for $50,000.00 was deposited into the Office Account.

M4 This $50,000.00 was properly characterised as trust monies.

M5 In the circumstances described above, the Solicitor:

(a) In breach of Section 254 of the Act failed to deposit trust monies into a General Trust Account; and

(b) In breach of Section 260 of the Act, mixed trust monies with other monies.

M6 On 21 July 2010, the Solicitor arranged for a cheque for $50,000.00 payable to Mr Mawson to be drawn from the Office Account to complete the settlement.

In the matter of Riddle & Mathews

R1 The Solicitor acted for Mr Paul Riddle in a matter against his former de facto wife, Ms Rachel Mathews.

R2 The matter settled.

R3 One term of the settlement was that Mr Riddle pay Ms Mathews $20,000.00.

R4 The Solicitors fees of $3,000.00 were agreed between the Solicitor and Mr Riddle.

R5 The Solicitor received a cheque for $23,000.00 comprising settlement monies of $20,000.00 plus costs of $3,000.00 and deposited it into the Office Account on 17 November 2010.

R6 This $23,000.00 was properly characterised as trust monies.

R7 In the circumstances described above the Solicitor:

(a) In breach of Section 254 of the Act, failed to deposit trust monies into a General Trust Account; and

(b) In breach of Section 260 of the Act, mixed trust monies and other monies.

R8 On 27 January 2011 the Solicitor arranged for a Bank cheque for $20,000.00 to be drawn on the Office Account in satisfaction of the term of settlement described in paragraph R3 above.

R9 The Solicitor issued a Bill of Costs on 28 February 2011.

Evidence

4 The Applicant relied upon Affidavits sworn by Lilly Hagberg on 26 March 2012 (LH Affidavit) and Anne-Marie Foord sworn 28 March 2012 (A-MF Affidavit). These were admitted into evidence without objection (with the exception of paragraph 9 of the latter) and were read accordingly.

5 The Solicitor filed a Reply in which she admitted the alleged breaches of ss.254 and 260 of the Act, but she asserted that any misappropriation was 'committed inadvertently' and that she 'did not intend to permanently deprive any client of moneys'. She did not otherwise file any evidence.

Relevant Legislation

6 The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:

254 Certain trust money to be deposited in general trust account

(1) Subject to section 258A, as soon as practicable after receiving trust money, a law practice must deposit the money in a general trust account of the practice unless:

(a) the practice has a written direction by an appropriate person to deal with it otherwise than by depositing it in the account, or

(b) the money is controlled money, or

(c) the money is transit money, or

(d) the money is the subject of a power given to the practice or an associate of the practice to deal with the money for or on behalf of another person.

Maximum penalty; 100 penalty units.

260 Intermixing Money

(1) A law practice must not, otherwise than as permitted by subsection (2), mix trust money with other money.

Maximum penalty; 100 penalty units.

(2) A law practice is permitted to mix trust money with other money to the extent only that is authorised by the Law Society Council and in accordance with any conditions imposed by the Law Society Council in relation to the authorisation.

496 Unsatisfactory professional conduct

For the purposes of this Act:

"unsatisfactory professional conduct" includes conduct of an Australian legal practitioner occurring in connection with the practice of law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent Australian legal practitioner."

497 Professional misconduct

(1) For the purposes of this Act:

"professional misconduct" includes:

(a) unsatisfactory professional conduct of an Australian legal practitioner where the conduct involves a substantial or consistent failure to reach or maintain a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, ...

498 Conduct capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct

(1) Without limiting section 496 or 497, the following conduct is capable of being unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct:

(a) conduct consisting of a contravention of this Act, the regulations or the legal professional rules ...

Determination

7 We are comfortably satisfied on the evidence before us that in each instance the monies received by the Solicitor were properly categorised as trust monies.

8 Accordingly, Grounds 1 and 2 of the Application have been made out and we find that the Solicitor's conduct in relation to Grounds 1 and 2 constitutes professional misconduct for the purposes of Section 497 of the Act.

9 In relation to the allegation of misappropriation, we note that the Reply did not actually dispute the allegation, but rather stated "... any misappropriation was committed inadvertently" (emphasis added).

10 In this regard, the Society adopted the definition of misappropriation that was expressed by Young JA in the Council of the Law Society of NSW v. Doherty [2010] NSWCA 177 at [41]. His Honour considered, referring to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (7th edition, vol. 12 at 1689), that the base meaning of the word misappropriation is "wrongful conversion".

11 The Society submitted that conversion is an intentional tort and is actionable per se (see: Lancashire Railway Co v. MacNicoll (1919) 88 LJKB 601). Further, as Dixon J held in Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v. Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204 at [229]

"The essence of conversion is dealing with a chattel in a manner repugnant to the immediate right of possession of the person who has the property or special property in the chattel".

12 The Society argued that for misappropriation to be established, it was necessary that the alleged convertor intended to do that which would deprive or impair the owner's immediate right to possession, or to do the act of converting a thing to one's own use or the intention to do the act of dealing with a thing, but that no wrongful motive is required and it was not necessary that the convertor did not intend to challenge the owner's right to possession (see: Penfolds Wines at [218 - 19] per Latham CJ, 234-5 per McTiernan J). Further, it was not necessary for the claimant to prove that they have suffered harm and/or that the alleged convertor had an intention to cause harm.

13 The Society further submitted that in the context of disciplinary proceedings, a finding of professional misconduct at common law required that a measure of "dishonesty" or some comparable mental element must be demonstrated on the facts of the case (see: Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v. Simpson [2011] NSWADT 242 at [50]).

14 In this regard, Ms Groenwegen argued that while it is necessary to consider the Solicitor's mental state -"the knowledge, belief or intention", it is not necessary to establish that she knew or believed [or intended] that her actions were dishonest and that what must be established is that she subjectively intended to do the acts that are said to be objectively dishonest by reference to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people (see: Bell J in Brereton v. Legal Services Commissioner [2010] VSC 378(Brereton) at 52 [and 53] cited in Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v. Simpson [2011] NSWADT 242 at [33]).

15 There are, of course, conflicting authorities as to whether a mental element of dishonesty is necessary for a finding of misappropriation in a disciplinary context.

16 In Law Society of New South Wales v. McCarthy [2003] NSWADT 198, this Tribunal noted that by referring to the charge of misappropriation, the Society

"... was seeking to refer to no more than the fact of the payment of the money into the personal account and the subsequent use of the money for purposes other than immediate payment to Counsel. It was not seeking to suggest that the practitioner had engaged in any more heinous conduct (at [21])".

17 In McCarthy, the Solicitor did not operate a trust account. Upon settlement of a client's case he received payment for costs and disbursements that he had incurred on behalf of the client in the sum of $4,200 (the cheque being made payable to him). This included counsel's fees of $3,000. He deposited the cheque into his personal account, but he did not pay Counsel's fees until the following year. The Tribunal held that the Solicitor was guilty of misappropriation, but it did not find that there was dishonesty on his part.

18 In Doherty, Young JA adopted a broader meaning of "misappropriation" and expressed the opinion that misappropriation has 'a wide ambit of meanings'.

19 However, in Brereton,Bell J held that misappropriation meant "the wrongful conversion of or dealing with anything by the person to whom it was entrusted" (see: at [49]). Her Honour held that it followed that "misappropriation" in its ordinary sense involved a mental element and that misappropriation is: "dishonestly misapplying property, including money, held on behalf of another" (see: at [50]).

20 "Dishonesty" is not defined in the Act and it therefore necessary to consider its meaning at common law. In this regard, we note that in Brereton, Bell J referred to the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Harle v. Legal Practitioners Liability Committee (2004) 13 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-605 at [29-30], where Chernov JA (Callaway and Buchanan JJA agreeing) held:

"It seems clear enough that where, as here, dishonesty is not used in a special sense in relation to statutory offences, it is not a term of art and is to be given its ordinary meaning. It embraces deliberate conduct which is considered to be dishonest by the standard of ordinary decent people or, put another way, the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people. Whether particular conduct amounts to dishonesty involves the consideration of the mental state - the knowledge, belief or intention - of a person whose conduct is impugned."

21 Considering the decision in Harle, Bell J observed at [53]:

"While an allegation of dishonesty requires consideration of the person's mental state, in neither the criminal nor the civil context is it necessary to establish that the person subjectively knew or believed that the actions concerned were dishonest. What must be established is that the person subjectively intended to do the acts which are said to be objectively dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people."

22 In determining whether conduct is dishonest Bell J felt that the proper course to be followed was that explained by Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Peters v. R (1998) [1998] HCA 7: 192 CLR 493 at [504] as follows:

"In a case in which it is necessary for a jury to decide whether an act is dishonest, the proper course is for the trial judge to identify the knowledge, belief or intent which is said to render that act dishonest and instruct the jury to decide whether the accused had that knowledge, belief or intent and, if so to determine whether on that account the act was dishonest ... if the question is whether the act was dishonest according to ordinary notions, it is sufficient that the jury be instructed that that is to be decided by the standards of ordinary, decent people."

23 Bell J considered that the steps to be involved in this formulation were; at [54]:

(1) Identify the knowledge, belief or intent which is said to render the acts dishonest;

(2) Determine whether the accused (or defendant in the civil context) subjectively had that knowledge, belief or intent;

(3) Determine whether, on that account, the acts were objectively dishonest according to the standards of ordinary and decent (that is reasonable and honest) people.

24 This tribunal considered the decision in Brereton in The Council of the Law Society of New South Wales v. Clapin [2011] NSWADT 83 (at [226]). Having done so, it held that dishonesty is a necessary element in any charge of misappropriation. However, it was not satisfied on the facts of that case that this had been established.

25 In Simpson the Tribunal considered an allegation of misappropriation where the Solicitor's employees did not attend to the proper payment of disbursements. It held that authorities including McCarthy established that a Solicitor could be guilty of misappropriation as he was ultimately responsible for the payments. However, as the evidence established that the Solicitor had been unaware of relevant aspects of his staff's conduct regarding the payment of disbursements and that he believed that the monies that were deposited into his office account "were quite properly payable in that manner",it concluded that his conduct did not amount to misappropriation.

26 In reaching its conclusion in Simpson, the Tribunal also noted that in Brereton, Bell J adopted the decision in Myers v. Ellman [1940] AC 282 at [288-289] and held that as professional misconduct at common law is conduct which

"... would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute and competency ... mere negligence, even of a serious character, will not suffice".

Her Honour further observed at [59]:

"The state of knowledge, belief or intend associated with being negligent, incompetent and in reckless disregard of professional responsibilities is less than, and does not amount to, dishonesty, and is not sufficient to establish that a lawyer is guilty of misappropriation ..."

27 The Victorian Court of Appeal further considered these issues in Legal Services Commissioner v. Brereton [2011] VSCA 241. Ashley JA (agreeing with Tate JA at [2]) said that he preferred to leave for final decision on another day the question of whether proof of dishonesty is always required when a charge of misappropriation is brought in a professional disciplinary context.

28 In this regard, Tate JA observed:

"In my opinion there remains doubt whether at law a legal practitioner can only be guilty of misappropriation if he or she has acted dishonestly".

And further at [69]:

"With great respect to the Trial Judge, it is unclear whether dishonesty is the necessary element of misappropriation in the common law sense. In my opinion, there is room for doubt whether dishonesty is always an integral element of a charge of misappropriation, within a professional disciplinary context."

29 In reaching this conclusion, Her Honour referred to the decision of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australian in Legal Practitioners Conduct Board v. Jones [2010] SAS CFC 51 (at [12]), which acknowledged the distinction between 'misappropriation' and 'fraudulent misappropriation' in the disciplinary context. She posed the following question:

"If an allegation of misappropriation necessarily incorporates dishonesty as an element, what is added by the ostensibly additional element of charging a practitioner with fraudulent misappropriation?"

Her Honour also considered the reasoning of Gibbs CJ in Daly v. Sydney Stock Exchange Limited [1986] HCA 25; (1986) 160 CLR 371. That matter involved the alleged defalcation by a stockbroker, in which Gibbs CJ recognised that in the absence of a statutory definition 'a defalcation need not require dishonesty even where the defalcation occurs by means of misappropriation'. Tate JA observed:

"This is consistent with the objectives of legislation creating civil norms governing the conduct of legal practitioners, the aim of which is the protection of the public and not the denunciation of the practitioner. That aim is furthered if the threshold for disciplinary action is lower rather than higher, with the penalty for contravention being suitably adjusted depending on the circumstances of the case" at [73].

30 This analysis of misappropriation, which does not compromise a mental element of dishonesty, is perhaps more consistent with the principle that monies received by a solicitor from or on behalf of a client and which are not intended to become the beneficial property of the solicitor, are subject to fiduciary obligations on the part of the solicitor.

31 In this context, for a Solicitor to apply or disburse trust money inconsistently with the terms under which it was received can be viewed as a fiduciary breach and it is no defence that the client suffered no loss as a result of the breach or that the solicitor acted with bona fides or honestly (see: Riley Solicitors Manual at 35, 055. 10-25; Council of the Queensland Law Society Inc v. Wakeling [2004] QCA 42, Stewart v. Layton (1992) 111 ALR 687).

32 In our view, the current matter is distinguishable on its facts from Simpson, in that the Solicitor is a sole practitioner and therefore had personal knowledge of her Firm's accounting practices.

33 The Solicitor submitted that "Any misappropriation was committed inadvertently. There was never any intention on the part of the Respondent to permanently deprive any client of money". Further, in her letter to the Society dated 9 January 2011, she stated:

"If I had a trust account at this time there would not have been ... the inadvertent misappropriation of funds for disbursements held for whatever period of time."

Further, in her letter to the Society dated 12 September 2011, she stated:

"... monies received for Moore Stephens should have been placed in a trust account not an office account, where it was inadvertently used for other expenditures for periods."

In a further letter to the Society dated 16 September 2011, she stated:

"... the word 'misappropriation' ... assumes that I would not have transferred money from say, my savings account, to cover the disbursement at any time that I wished to pay the disbursement".

34 In the current matter, the evidence indicates that in the matter of Stokes, but for the deposit of the relevant trust monies into her office account on 23 March 2009 (and until 14 April 2010), the office account would have been in deficit for a total of 53 days.

35 We are satisfied that the deposit of trust monies into the office account was a deliberate act on the Solicitor's part and not an act of mere inadvertence and that her actions in subsequently operating on her office account, such that its balance fell below the total of the trust monies, were similarly deliberate and not acts of mere inadvertence on her part. In doing so, she converted the trust monies to her own use.

36 We are therefore satisfied on the facts of this matter that Ground 3 is established and that the Solicitor is guilty of misappropriation and that this is further evidence of professional misconduct on her part.

Matters Relevant to Penalty

37 The Solicitor properly conceded that her conduct fell short of the standard required of her as a legal practitioner. She stated that she is "appalled that she has done things even inadvertently to cause the effect of misappropriation". She stated:

"I still have trouble with the word 'misappropriation' in that it assumes that I would not have transferred money from say, my savings account, to cover the disbursement at any time that I wished to pay the disbursement".

38 In mitigation, the Solicitor submitted that in the matter of Stroud, she was 'completely unaware' that she did not have sufficient funds in her office account to cover from time to time the amount of the trust monies. She further stated that she was not aware that she was required to notify the Society of the deposit that gave rise to the breach of s.263 of the Act.

39 In our view, the Solicitor's evidence and submissions on this matter indicate a lack of appreciation of her obligations in relation to the management of trust monies. It is irrelevant that she could have replenished her office account from other sources of funds. The fact is that having wrongly deposited the monies into her office account, she failed to exercise proper vigilance to ensure that the balance of her office account did not fall below the amount of the trust monies. As a consequence, she converted trust monies to her own use and benefit.

40 In the matters of Riddle & Matthews, the Solicitor has acknowledged that the relevant funds should have been deposited into a trust account and that a Memorandum should have been issued before any monies were transferred to her office account and that notification of the deposit should have been sent to the Society.

41 In the matter of Mawson, the Respondent stated that her client's father issued a cheque in her favour for $50,000, being settlement monies payable by her client to her client's husband. She received the cheque on 19 July 2010 and arranged for a bank cheque to be drawn on 21 July 2010 to complete the settlement. She said that she was not aware that she was required to report the receipt to the Society, although she is now aware of this and she accepted that the monies should have been placed into a trust account.

42 In her letter to the Law Society dated 16 September 2011, the Solicitor stated that after being admitted to practice in 1991, she spent "a couple of years" with a general suburban practice in Brookvale, after which she worked for the Legal Aid Commission for several years. She was not exposed to the operation of trust accounts during that period. When she opened her own practice, she planned to work part-time, doing mostly criminal work, and was reluctant to set up a trust account "with the assumption that I would not need one having regard to the type of work I was doing mainly criminal". However, she practice gradually changed so that she was doing more family law work and less criminal law work. She said that she asked her family law clients to pay settlement monies and disbursements directly.

43 The Solicitor conceded that her approach of "trying to run a practice without a trust account" has "proved to be a disaster of major proportion", but that this only become clear to her when the Trust Account Inspection that gave rise to the current complaints took place. She said that she opened a trust account with the National Australia Bank on 17 June 2011 (soon after the inspection).

44 The Solicitor stated that on 26 October 2011 she did a course operated by Young Lawyers, namely "Trust Account Compliance and Overview of Trust Money and Records on 26 October 2011 and that she was prepared to undertake any further courses that were felt necessary.

45 In our view, it is significant that despite the allegation of misappropriation, the Society has not sought a protective order. While we are not bound by the order sought by the Society, we are nevertheless that the Solicitor has learned from her mistakes and that she is unlikely to commit any further similar acts in the future. On that basis, we are comfortably satisfied that she is not permanently unfit to practice and that a protective order is not appropriate.

46 We also regard it as significant that the Society did not request the imposition of a fine. Ms Groenwegen stated that this was because the Solicitor had held a practising certificate for more than 20 years, during which she had not been the subject of any previous complaints, and that she co-operated fully with the investigation of the complaints before us.

47 For these reasons, we are satisfied that the orders sought in the Application are appropriate.

Orders

48 We make the following orders:

(1) The Solicitor is to be publicly reprimanded;

(2) The Solicitor is to successfully complete a course on trust Accounting that is approved by the Manager, Professional Standards Department, within a period of six (6) months from the date of this decision; and

(3) The Solicitor is to pay the Society's costs, which have been agreed in the sum of $3,800, such payment to be made within 6 months from the date of this decision.

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Decision last updated: 31 October 2012